


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**OHIO MILITIA**  
and  
**The West Virginia Campaign**  
**1861**  
**With Supplemental Notes**



**CARRINGTON**



# OHIO MILITIA

AND THE

## WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN

1861

ADDRESS OF GENERAL CARRINGTON

To Army of West Virginia  
At Marietta, Ohio, Sept. 10, 1870

*NEW EDITION*



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**ERRATA.**— Page 9, thirteenth line from bottom, should read "Noah H. Swayne." He became Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, and his son, Colonel Wager Swayne, who lost a leg in the war, became as eminent at the law as his father was distinguished on the bench. Aaron F. Perry, who accompanied Mr. Swayne to Washington, afterwards removed to Cincinnati, was elected to Congress, and attained high distinction both as citizen and lawyer.

# OHIO MILITIA

## AND THE WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

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Responsive to "request of the Society of the Army of West Virginia, that a full statement of the part borne by the Militia of Ohio in the rescue of West Virginia in 1861, be furnished by Col. Henry B. Carrington, U. S. A., at the Reunion of the Society, at Marietta, Ohio, Sept. 19, 1879."

### COMRADES OF THE ARMY OF WEST VIRGINIA :

It is well to save for some future historian the record of all facts which marked the outbreak of the American Rebellion. There are times when noiseless work does much to prepare and ensure that more visible and emphatic action which fixes the destiny of a nation or race. Your society aims to secure and record all facts which gave to West Virginia its independence. The national record deals chiefly with the Federal call upon the States for troops and the conduct of those troops. The rescue of West Virginia from the first grasp of invasion has less distinctive mention, because the troops which first entered the field were not originally on the Roll of United States Volunteers, but were Militia of Ohio. They did indeed quite generally re-enlist in the national service, and the government eventually recognized their early organization ; but there was a brief period of grave and determining value, in which their action was as significant as when the campaign of 1861 matured and became a grand factor in the operations of the war.

With all credit to those who have compiled the Ohio war record, it is not strictly true that the war burst upon Ohio without either warning or preparation ; nor that the excitement of the hour so confused her State officials that an excess of accepted troops embarrassed the real issue. The very organization of a force beyond the limits of the call rendered possible its ultimate movement into West Virginia before the United States Volunteers could be armed and equipped for active service. Neither was the pressure greater than in Indiana, of which its official historian writes : "The Governor, finding it impossible to restrain the tide of volunteers within the narrow limits of the three months' call, tendered additional regiments. Companies came without orders, or rather in defiance of orders, in the hope that they could be received, or that a second call would be at once made. At that time communication with Washington by telegraph had been cut off."

Neither Governor Dennison nor the Adjutant General of Ohio could, under the urgency of the first call, work up fully the enormous detail of labor immediately involved, and so promptly divide and classify it as to act upon a settled War Department System. Twenty-four hours was not time enough for a day's work. A volume of Regulations and Tactics had been published by that officer, under legislative sanction, but this assumed the ability of the General Government to furnish arms and equipments for any emergency, and assumed the use of blank forms to save penmanship. The office of Adjutant General, upon the peace establishment, had very limited executive authority, but his immediate action, approved by the Governor, was to order all the active militia companies to report for service. Hence it was that twenty companies, already organized, but recruited to full strength, were started for Washington within sixty hours after receipt of President Lincoln's call. Simultaneously with this official appeal to the organized militia, there necessarily came to the Governor himself a demand for commissions and authority to raise companies, and even regiments, from all parts of the State.

The prompt response of the militia and the offers of the people, as in Indiana, outnumbered the demand. It was not designed that full regiments should be accepted upon individual offers; but when the Adjutant General established Camp Taylor at Cleveland, and found that Toledo had placed in that camp ten full companies, under James B. Steedman, he accepted the organization as a regiment, and that action was endorsed by the Governor on the following day. It was deemed more important to secure immediate organization than to wait for a logical distribution of the force over the State at large. The necessity for some peremptory limit to the acceptance of companies compelled the earliest practicable sub-division of the work, and applications for assignment were soon dealt with upon a basis absolutely impossible during the first alarm, when men and companies boarded trains without authority, and understood a telegram, "Await instructions" to mean "Come along soon."

The historian of "Ohio in the War," in the main just, overlooked the fact that when, in May, 1861, the Adjutant General was appointed to a Colonelcy in the Regular Army, he was directed, at the request of the State authorities and with the approval of the War Department, to still act as Adjutant General until July 1, 1861, and until General C. P. Buckingham, his nominated assistant and ultimate successor, could organize the State Commissary Department upon a practical basis. By that time twenty-six regiments had been organized. His active assistant was Captain Calvin Goddard, afterward Colonel, and a brilliant member of the staff of General Rosecrans. Captain L. S. Sullivant, Captain Thomas Donaldson and Mr. H. T. Miller rendered efficient service in recording assignments and other matters of detail.

On the 27th of April, the Secretary of War telegraphed to the Adjutant General: "I would tender to you, as I have already to His

Excellency, the Governor of Ohio, the thanks of this Department for the promptness and energy with which you have met the call of the Government. I regret that, according to the plans adopted and under which this Department is acting, we can only accept for the present the quota first called for from Ohio. You will do well, however, in organizing and drilling other regiments, so as to be prepared to meet any emergency that may arise."

The policy which led the Adjutant General to summon the organized militia to arms was vindicated when the two regiments started for Washington; but, more emphatically, when it enabled him to place a six-gun battery of that militia on the Ohio River more than a month before a single regiment of Ohio or Indiana Volunteers had been mustered into the United States service. That policy was not from the inspiration of the crisis alone. The firing upon Sumter did not begin the war. War already existed, and it is only just to the memory of the dead, to place on record, in this very connection, some facts which placed Ohio in a position to act at once when open violence began the struggle for national life.

The inaugural message of Governor Dennison stated the condition of the State Militia, and urged that the Report and earnest recommendations of the Adjutant General receive careful attention. That officer had, under legislative authority, prepared plans and caused the erection of a State Arsenal from proceeds of sales of old State property; but the Militia proper had received no pecuniary aid from the State. Governor Wise of Virginia took occasion to ridicule the poor exhibit of Ohio Militia, which Governor Dennison's message presented, and with keen irony deprecated the possible "invasion of Virginia by the Ohio Army of *twelve hundred men in uniform*." And yet both Steedman and Barnett were prominent officers of that Militia, and their antecedent preparation was vindicated by their subsequent career, when with less than 1,200 Ohio Militia they marched from Parkersburg to Grafton.

The Report of the Adjutant General for 1858-9 had submitted for the action of the Legislature a statement of the support which other States rendered to their Militia, and had given the organized companies as one hundred and fifty, with a nominal strength of four thousand men. The result of personal visits to New York and Massachusetts, during their Division, Brigade and Regimental manœuvres, had also been fully stated, and when Governor Dennison entered upon office, he heartily seconded the efforts which had been made by his predecessor to place the State Militia upon a permanent basis. A brief history of its organization will show that the contingency which came so suddenly in 1861 had not been wholly unanticipated.

Governor Chase began a systematic organization in 1857, by appointing a full staff, requiring them to uniform; and obtained for his own use the proper equipage. Arms were not issued until companies uniformed strictly in accordance with State regulations, and

officers of every rank throughout the State were required to furnish themselves with a complete service outfit, and full horse-equipments for all who were mounted.

An incident occurred during the summer of 1857, which stimulated the zeal of Governor Chase in this direction. In connection with the Green County case, under the Fugitive Slave law, a conflict of jurisdiction had arisen between the Federal and State authorities. He sent the Judge Advocate General, afterwards Adjutant General, to Washington, to present the issue to President Buchanan and Secretary Cass, and to arrange for a personal interview with himself. Governor Chase affirmed that "he would vindicate the State authorities in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, once acquired, if it took every man in the State to do it; while equally respecting Federal process where it rightfully acquired first jurisdiction." To the remark of Mr. Cass, "Why, this may involve civil war," the answer was, "No; but if the South forces these petty demands for fugitives upon us much longer, gaining nothing, but mortifying self respect and bringing reproach upon all free institutions, they will force a war of sections, or, worse yet, bring about an eventual war of races among themselves." The cases were settled by the compromise of *general dismissal of the personal suits*; but Governor Chase at once decided to foster the Militia to the extent of his influence and authority.

On the 19th of January, 1858, he presided at a State Convention of nearly two hundred officers who had complied with orders to fully uniform, and that body embraced such names as \*Lyttle, \*Steedman, \*Bates, \*Beatty, \*Jones, King, Parrott, Barnett, McMillen, \*Frizell, \*Tyler, and many others who, upon the first call to arms, were found prompt and ready. Those indicated \* were General officers of the Militia, and attained the same rank during the war. C C. Walcott and Theodore Jones, successively captains of the Columbus Videttes, a company which marched with the first two regiments, also became distinguished General officers. On the 3d of July, 1858, Governor Chase reviewed the State Militia at Dayton, Ohio, where seven brigades were represented by two or more companies each, and where thorough inspection and contest for a silver medal took place. *Every company there present responded to the call of the Adjutant General in 1861.*

Another fact of previously unwritten history will illustrate the idea of Governor Chase in his earnest purpose to encourage the Militia, and it is kindred in element to that which transpired in 1857, when, upon the fine and imprisonment of Langston and others at Cleveland, under the Fugitive Slave law, the question of their rightful imprisonment was raised upon the issue of a writ of habeas corpus by the State Supreme Court, and he ordered the Militia companies at Columbus to be silently placed under arms for the purpose of sustaining such action as the Court might make in the premises. The parties were remanded by the Court to the custody of the United



States Marshal, and the Militia were relieved from duty. Mr. Wolcott, the attorney who argued the case for the State, subsequently became the Judge Advocate General of Governor Dennison, eminent for valuable service to the State early in the war, and became Assistant Secretary of War.

These facts furnish a key to that persistent endorsement of the Militia on every proper occasion, which sometimes drew forth sneers, as if all were mere fuss and show, when in fact his purpose was to prepare a fit body of men for possible duty in behalf of the State or Nation. His convictions did not diminish when transferred to the United States Senate. In a letter to the Adjutant General of Ohio, dated February 7th, 1861, he wrote: "Our most sober thinkers and those best informed, as well as conservative men from the South, predict war. Our Militia should be officered by the wisest and best men. How soon they may be needed no man can tell." Secretary Cass, in a subsequent letter to the same officer, wrote: "We have indeed fallen upon evil times, when those who should preserve seem bent upon destroying the country." (See Note II., page 15.)

It was, therefore, not without some reflection, that before the attack upon Fort Sumter, the Adjutant General felt impelled to assert in a public address, deemed wild by some, that "a war was impending which would outlast a presidential term, would cost hundreds of thousands of lives and thousands of millions of money."\* By many that appeal was classed with the demand of General W. T. Sherman, that two hundred thousand men should be placed in Kentucky. It is, however, a fact that such convictions had their influence, when Ohio, with her Militia organization, was called to take part in real war.

The work so well begun by Governor Chase was followed up by Governor Dennison with animation and hopefulness. On the 10th of September, 1860, a formal parade took place at Cleveland, on the occasion of the Perry Monument celebration, in which Barnett's full battery, the first organized in any State of the Union, as a Light Battery, not excepting that of Rhode Island, gave evidence of that discipline which it subsequently displayed. One section, under command of Captain David L. Wood (Quartermaster General of Ohio under Governor Chase, and until May, 1861, under Governor Dennison), had been specially complimented by General Scott, both at Niagara Falls and Auburn, several years before.

With this introductory statement, it is not to be denied that the want of legislative appreciation and support was fast wearing out the patience of the Militia just when the summons came for action, and when the previous neglect of the State to foster its Militia was fully exposed. The history of regiments regularly mustered into the

\*NOTE. — "The Crisis, the Peril and the Duty." First delivered at Columbus, April 11, 1861, and again on the 17th, upon the written request of Senators Garfield, Cox and fifteen other senators.

United States service is fully unfolded in public records. The regiments of Ohio militia which made a surplus over the first call for troops, were put in the field under every embarrassment which could attend a condition of affairs, when even blank Rolls were poorly supplied, when armed men were wanted at once to protect the Ohio border, and when mere presence at the front was of more value than prolonged instruction in camp.

Formal shape had been given to the organization of the United States three months troops, under a provision of the State Militia laws which authorized the Governor to fill vacancies in the rank of Brigadier General, until an election could be ordered. Several of the Brigade Districts had but one company. The old Act of Congress provided that when the Militia were called into the service of the United States, they should be commanded by officers of that Militia. Senators Cox and Schleich (the latter Captain of an excellent Militia company at Lancaster, Ohio), were appointed Brigadier Generals of Militia by the Governor. General J. H. Bates was already in commission at Cincinnati. Prompt legislation left the general command to some citizen of Ohio, at large, and General McClellan was entrusted with that command, and was also commissioned as Major General in the Regular Army. Camp Dennison was established as the rendezvous for the United States Volunteers, and all other troops were concentrated at Cleveland, Columbus, Zanesville, Lancaster and Athens.

The State accepted the surplus regiments for State defense, and the work of clothing and equipment began, with absolutely no assurance that the General Government could render such timely aid as would make them effective troops for the immediate emergency. Hurried contracts for board took the place of rations proper, and the difficulties were the greater in proportion as the capacity of Camp Dennison made its demands imperative, and it seemed as if it would take months to grade, arrange, and supply water there.

The Federal authorities lacked system, under the great pressure, hardly less than did those of the State; and State authority had to bear much of the responsibility for discomfort at the Federal camp. Twice the Adjutant General (once with Governor Dennison) went to that post to influence to greater haste. It was in this emergency that a double question forced itself forward for solution. 1st. How can the State troops be armed? 2d. How can the State troops be best employed? The border counties of Ohio were nervous and anxious. The people were willing to do their part, but felt the need of organized support and wanted artillery. It was useless to send guns without ammunition and men accustomed to their use. Colonel Barnett had for more than a year previously reported his battery as fit for real service, and it had been fostered as the pride of the Ohio Militia system. With the despatch of twenty companies to the East, which embraced some of the best Militia companies of Cincinnati, Dayton,

Springfield, Cleveland and Columbus, there was no suitable infantry force to send to the border. All companies proper were being merged in the new organizations, Federal and State.

On Saturday, the 20th of April, the following telegram was sent :

COLUMBUS, OHIO, April 20th, 1861.

COLONEL JAMES BARNETT, Cleveland, Ohio.

Report your six pieces, caissons, and full battery, including the Geneva Company, at Columbus, forthwith — Monday, if possible. You can hire horses for the guns here, or at your point of service. Bring harness and everything else. Twenty men to each gun. You retain Colonels' rank.

By order,

H. B. CARRINGTON,  
*Adjutant General.*

Early on Sunday morning, April 21st, Mr. John Hall, an elder of the Second Presbyterian church, and director of Ambos & Co.'s foundry, was informed that cannon balls were needed. Two hundred round shot were made before midnight, powder was expressed from Springfield, flannel was purchased, and on Monday evening, when Barnett reached the depot he was supplied with ammunition, sealed orders, and sent forward to the border. A committee of citizens from Marietta came from Loveland on the cars, for cannon, and admired what they supposed to be an United States battery. They were easily persuaded to accompany the train, and the guns were in position at Marietta, Ohio, opposite Parkersburg, West Virginia, Tuesday evening, April 23d, little more than a week after the fall of Fort Sumner.

The organization of all the regiments was hurried. Besides Camp Jackson, just north of Columbus, Camp Chase was established four miles westward, for the formation of four additional regiments, the 23d, 24th, 25th and 26th. It seemed as if arms could not be procured even for the regular volunteers, and this was eventually done through the personal efforts of the Governor, Colonel Wolcott and others, as fully set forth in "Ohio in the War."

A discussion as to whether the first campaign should be aggressive or defensive was constantly held. Prominent citizens, Noah H. Snaggs and Aaron F. Perry, as is well known, volunteered to make their way to Washington while direct communication was cut off, to impress upon the Government the necessity for its prompt action; but it was not until May 24th that the Federal authorities and General McClellan were brought to a full accord and appreciation of the necessity for initiating active movements.

The Adjutant General had previously visited General Wool at Troy, and at once addressed him a letter setting forth the condition and movement of Barnett's battery, the want of arms for the State regiments, and his theory of the crisis. The following is an extract :

"It will be the policy of the Governor of Virginia to occupy the line of the Ohio river and make the free States the theatre of war. This will seal that river as a channel of Federal transportation, expose the rich counties of southern Ohio

to easy attack, furnish ample supplies for rebel troops and threatens all central lines of communication, East and West. The mountain ranges of western Virginia, only traversable through gaps, and easily defended, will give the enemy an advanced, if not an impregnable base; while all offensive operations will be at the expense of the free States adjoining, northward. Behind this mountain range, the interior railroad lines afford peculiar facilities for rapid reinforcement of each assailed position. The rebel right will then menace Maryland and Pennsylvania, while the left will absolutely control Kentucky and Tennessee. With Maryland so uncertain, this movement will command the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, so that a comparatively small force can successively attack five hundred miles of border line.

"By every principle of strategy the execution of some plan similar to this, must be the policy of the open rebellion. Whatever may be the effect of a movement upon Washington and the blockade of the Mississippi, it is vital to their success that Ohio be paralyzed, that Kentucky be secured and that the West and Northwest be cut off from their intimate relations with the East. West Virginia is an entering wedge to be held promptly and offensively by the North, since thereby Federal troops will threaten the left flank of all movements out of Richmond, and embarrass or counteract all rebel operations behind the mountain ranges as far as Kentucky and Tennessee."

An extract from General Wool's reply is worthy of record :

TROY, 4th June, 1861.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I tender you many thanks for your several communications and especially for your last, the 9<sup>th</sup> of May. I am made happy to know that Ohio approves of my conduct in relation to our once prosperous and happy country. In the recent appeal to save the capital from falling into the possession of the rebels, I did what I could to arm Ohio. . . .

Most truly your friend,

Gen. H. B. CARRINGTON,

JOHN E. WOOL.

*Adjutant General of Ohio.*

Notwithstanding the opinion above expressed was shared by Governor Dennison, Messrs. Garfield and others, it was not certain that the rebellion would begin a general offensive war; and the temporary danger of the capital so embarrassed the government as to crowd aside, for a time, less immediate issues. Governor Dennison believed and insisted that the thirteen regiments called for by the President would be, as really transpired, so wholly subject to Federal authority as to be of little practical avail for State defense, and in the necessity of putting the State regiments in condition for that purpose.

The crisis in West Virginia was indicated by a telegram to Governor Dennison from Mr. Carlisle, then at Wheeling, of May 20th, stating that rebels had occupied Grafton, and would break up the convention summoned for the second Monday thereafter unless troops were furnished. It was at this juncture that the arms were received from General Wool. Powder had to be purchased and cartridges fabricated. A lathe was purchased for rifling the bronze guns of the State, and James projectiles were ordered from Rhode Island. At this work Quartermaster General Wood was in his element, and a sufficient supply of ammunition was provided for an issue of 100

rounds to the whole force which had been rendezvoused at Cleveland, Columbus, Zanesville and Lancaster.

All questions as to the command of the Militia were solved after General McClellan's appointment as Major General, by an order placing the force under his command, and instructing the Adjutant General to visit that officer and to act under his orders in the disposition of these troops. At this time, while Governor Dennison was on a visit to Indianapolis for consultation with Governors Morton and Yates, General McClellan telegraphed the Adjutant General, "Mount Barnett's battery immediately." A despatch to Colonel Barnett to "Buy horses" was promptly followed by the action of Douglas Putnam, Esq., and other citizens of Marietta, who borrowed the money and furnished the horses. That night the Adjutant General returned to Cincinnati and received instructions to place one regiment at Belair, one at Marietta, and support them as efficiently as practicable by such disposition of the other regiments as he deemed best.

The following orders were issued by telegram at way stations on return to Columbus :

*Fourteenth Regiment.* Colonel Steedman (at Zanesville) move at once by Muskingum river to Marietta to support Barnett's Battery, already there, and await orders. Obey all orders from General McClellan.

*Seventeenth Regiment.* Colonel Connell (at Lancaster) move by rail to Zanesville, to support Steedman, ordered to Marietta. Transportation will be furnished.

*Fifteenth Regiment.* Colonel Andrews (at Zanesville) move by rail to Belair and await orders.

*Sixteenth Regiment.* Colonel Irvine (at Columbus) move by rail to Zanesville to support Andrews, ordered to Belair.

*Nineteenth Regiment.* Colonel Beatty, and *Twenty-First Regiment,* Colonel Norton (at Cleveland) move to Columbus forthwith for further orders and immediate service.

Senior officer of the *Twentieth Regiment.* Complete your organization at once.

To all camp commanders. Obey promptly all orders of Major General McClellan. The Governor puts him in command of the State troops.

Within six hours the combined movement was begun, telegrams having been sent to the proper steamboat and railroad authorities to honor all demands for transportation under the orders issued.

These orders bore date May 26th, 1861. On the 27th the Confederate forces reached Clarksburg, and at once moved down the line of the B. & O. railroad, destroying bridges.

The Wheeling convention was to meet on Monday, June 3d.

The 14th regiment received its orders on their date, May 26th,

reached Marietta the afternoon following, and at once occupied the heights back of Parkersburg. The delay of twelve hours would have found the enemy in that position. Lieutenant Colonel Sturgess' section of Barnett's battery had hardly fitted harness to their horses when ordered across the river by General McClellan, joining Steedman on the 28th. The 14th, acting under the personal supervision of Colonel Steedman, restored a bridge of 65 feet span and 45 feet in height, and with Sturgess reached Grafton on the 29th, just at the same time that Colonel Kelley of the 1st West Virginia and Colonel Andrews of the 15th Ohio arrived by the Belair route. The 16th Ohio soon followed, while two companies of the 19th relieved them on guard duty at Belair. The 18th regiment, Colonel Stanley, was retained at Athens to guard B. & O. railroad, while the 21st, Colonel Norton, was despatched to Gallipolis to watch the river border, and remained there until a movement was made up the Kanawha Valley. Barnett's remaining sections proceeded to Grafton. Grafton was thus occupied, and both forks of the B. & O. railroad were permanently secured to Federal control.

On the 29th of May the 9th Indiana, Colonel R. H. Milroy, left Indianapolis, Ind., and reached Grafton June 1st, where Brigadier General Thomas H. Morris, commanding Indiana three months' U. S. Volunteers, had established his headquarters. On May 30th, the 7th Indiana, Colonel E. Dumont, and the 6th Indiana, Colonel Thos. T. Crittenden, left Indianapolis, reaching Webster, West Virginia, June 2d. These regiments, with the 14th and 15th Ohio and Kelley's 1st West Virginia, fought the action at Phillipi at daybreak, June 3d, the plunging fire of Barnett's guns giving Colonel Potterfield the first intimation that a superior force commanded his camp.

The militia of Ohio had been thus hurried off, and none too soon; but the inferior clothing that had been sent from Philadelphia, of the same kind as that first furnished the Pennsylvania troops, was almost worthless, and there had not been time for the State authorities to buy material and manufacture elsewhere. The United States had no supplies, even for its volunteers. It seemed as if the troops were simply transferred to the field, there to be useless for want of common necessities in the way of outfit. Governor Dennison at once instructed the Adjutant General to visit every regiment and detachment, every bridge guard and picket of the Ohio regiments, and take such action as the necessity required. The 15th regiment had so nearly worn out their clothing and their shoes that they could not appear decently, and were assured that "they should not be moved from camp until fully refitted." Col. W. T. Coggschall, Aid and Military Secretary to Gov. Dennison, and Captain L. S. Sullivant, Aid to the Adjutant General, afterward Major of the 113th Ohio, accompanied that officer in this tour of inspection, and in thirty hours from receipt of telegram as to the situation, Governor Dennison placed new clothing, by a special train, in the camp of the regiment.

The battle of Phillipi had already been fought. Col. Kelly was lying at the Grafton hotel suffering from his wounds. The headquarters of Gen. Morris were at the same place. The 11th Indiana, Col. Lew Wallace, passed east from Indiana for Cumberland at midnight of the 9th, and on the 10th the Adjutant General proceeded to Phillipi where Barnett and Steedman, as well as Milroy's and Dumont's Indiana regiments were encamped.

During the inspection of the Ohio troops at that post, couriers arrived from Huttonville, with foaming and wearied horses, asking for aid. They reported the rebel force at less than six hundred men, poorly organized, with arms of miscellaneous pattern, two iron cannon, with little powder, but levying contributions upon the people. Col. Dumont was commanding at Phillipi, but was confined to his bed in the court house. With his sanction, however, a board of officers was convened and the testimony of the fugitives was reduced to writing by Col. Coggsall. A rigid examination led to the following action of the board of officers, and after a ride of twenty-five miles the same was submitted to Gen. Morris at Grafton about midnight.

PHILLIPI, W. VA., June 11, 1861.

The undersigned recommend immediate measures for the occupation of Huttonsville, to control all movements in Pigent's Valley, and cut off supplies to troops of the enemy that may be stationed between Huttonsville, Beverly and Staunton.

H. B. CARRINGTON, *Brig. Gen., Adj. Gen. Ohio.*

JAS. B. STEEDMAN, *Col. Com. 14th Ohio Reg.*

R. H. MILROY, *9th Ind. Reg.*

JAMES BARNETT, *1st Artillery.*

The plan, as digested, was that one section of the battery and twelve hundred infantry well supplied with ammunition but no change of clothing and only such transportation as could be impressed on the road, should be pushed forward to seize the pass: the infantry to move in two separate but supporting columns, and strike Huttonsville at early dawn. Gen. Morris advised delay for transportation and instructions; and as yet having no report of the result of Col. Wallace's movement toward Cumberland, no further action was taken. The Adjutant General took an engine for Parkersburg and Cincinnati, reporting the state of affairs to Gen. McClellan. His opinion was that the movement was well devised; but, *before further steps could be taken* an advance toward the Kanawha became necessary, and the enemy was reinforced at Huttonsville. The troops, however, remained at Phillipi for several weeks. Whether the character of the succeeding campaign would have been materially changed and the actions of Laurel Hill, Rich Mountain and Carnifax Ferry have been avoided, or modified, by the early occupation of Huttonsville Pass, cannot now be determined. The facts are given, so that the readiness of the Ohio Militia to meet their early part in that three months of service, may have a record with that which honors the volunteers who had been formally mustered into the U. S. service.

It is for others to bear witness to the services of those regiments which had been so mustered.

This much of the history of the Ohio Militia is fairly responsive to the request which calls its forth; and so much as savors of personal reminiscence expresses but the official action of the officer who labored for four years to prepare that militia for practical service, and was at last called upon to give it shape for the field, under circumstances of peril, haste and responsibility which no human sagacity could have foreseen, and which no human spirit could realize with undisturbed composure.

The operations of the spring of 1861 only introduced the struggle. The Society of the Army of West Virginia now represents fifty-seven Ohio Infantry regiments, besides Cavalry, Artillery and fourteen regiments of its National Guard, as well as twenty-one regiments from West Virginia and eight from Indiana. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Kentucky, New York and Michigan troops are comrades also.

It is not the part of patriotism to ignore past sacrifice and companionship, because the conflict was between brethren; but rather to honor all true valor, and in devotion to the restored Republic, to labor and pray that peace, fraternity, and excellence in the pursuits of a wholesome, genuine peace shall crown the people with prosperity and the Nation with a perpetual life.



**AUTHOR'S NOTE I.** Volume 1, Series III., War Records, gives quite fully the telegrams that passed between Governor Dennison and his Adjutant General, and the War Department, showing the readiness of Ohio to increase its quota promptly to 50,000 men, and that General Woot's prompt action, both as to arms and ammunition, gave Ohio the vantage ground of immediate ability to meet the fullest possible call.

A reprint of the foregoing Address explains much that in the hurry of the early war period was not appreciated nor understood by superficial observers who exacted of a State military organization a perfect system of military conduct, in the very directions where even the War Department was equally confused and over-worked. The records explain all.

It is but justice to add that the 18th U. S. Infantry was practically an Ohio Regiment, as from the 4,773 men enlisted in its ranks during the Civil War, 3,100 were Americans by birth, and of these, 2,049 were citizens of Ohio. Its Colonel had the appointment of its 2nd Lieutenants, under the Act increasing the Regular Army. Among the young men induced to enlist and take a Lance Sergeantcy, with view to promotion, Gilbert S. Carpenter, of Western Reserve College, William H. Bisbee, of Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, Henry B. Freeman, of Mount Vernon, Ohio, are on the Army List of Brigadier Generals retired; Lieut. John F. Hitchcock, of Western Reserve College, and son of its President, was killed at Stone River. Frederick H. Brown, of Toledo, Ohio, afterwards Quartermaster of the 18th, then Captain, was killed in the Fetterman Massacre, Dec. 21, 1866. Lieut. Thaddeus P. Kirtland is on the Army List as Major, retired, Henry C. Litchfield, late Major, deceased, belonged to the Chicago Zouaves. Lieut. Frederick H. Phisterer became Adjutant of the Regiment, then Captain, but resigned, and has been for many years indentified with the Adjutant Generals' Office of New York, and a son is now Captain in the Regular Coast Artillery.

**NOTE II.** Upon receipt of Letter of Senator Chase, noted on Page 7, the Adjutant General obtained a list of all West Point graduates then living in Ohio, including McClellan, Rosecrans, Bates, Sill and Hildebrand, and their services were called into requisition upon receipt of the President's Call. At midnight Governor Dennison accompanied the Adjutant General to the residences of officers of the Columbus Militia Companies, and at 10 A. M. in the morning every company was reported as filling its quota for immediate service. Judge Advocate Stanley Matthews, of General Lytle's Militia Division, accepted position as Major in one of the new regiments.

H. B. C.

Hyde Park, Mass., April 19, 1904.



## The Ohio Militia of the Reserve.

Supplemental to Col. H. B. Carrington's Address to the Society of the Army of West Virginia, delivered at Marietta in 1879, entitled "The Ohio Militia in the West Virginia Campaign, 1861."

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The spontaneous uprising of the people of Ohio, upon receipt of the President's call for 75,000 men, with an assigned quota of only thirteen regiments to that State, did not accord with its estimate of the rightful demand upon its military resources, in view of the fact that Ohio, by location, must bear the chief burden of conflict at the West, in the first instance.

A plan was therefore devised by which to meet all possible contingencies, in accord with the plan submitted to General Wool and which had its fruition in the First Western Virginia Campaign.

The plan had its expression as follows :

From the OHIO STATE JOURNAL, May 7, 1861.

### OHIO MILITIA OF THE RESERVE, 1861.

We call attention to General Order No. 17, and hope that every paper in the State will copy it without expense to the State.

General Carrington drafted a bill which has become a law, urging a "Militia of the Reserve." Involving no expense and no interference with the peaceful pursuits of the people, it is admirably calculated to supply the material for a vast army, when the same shall be needed. Having brought nearly twenty-five thousand men under discipline, since receipt of the President's proclamation, General Carrington is now preparing a system which will render any future requisitions susceptible to an immediate response.

The system is based upon the Prussian, with such modifications as have been suggested by the new Rifle Corps of England.

GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS, ADJT. GENL'S OFFICE,  
COLUMBUS, O., May 6, 1861.

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 17.

The twenty days' limit for the dispersion of rebels now in arms against the United States has expired. Whether the struggle for vindication of the imperilled Union shall be brief or protracted, the result is certain. The destinies of all nations are interwoven with that of America, and the issue is made up. She will meet the crisis firmly and fulfill her part. The more decided her action, the sooner will peace succeed war and loyalty supplant treason.

To give force and system to our action, the following General Order is promulgated.

I. The Militia is divided into the "Active Army of Operation" and the Militia of the Reserve. The nine regiments now encamped

(additional to the thirteen mustered into the United States service) and such further regiments as the General Assembly shall authorize, will be mustered into the State Service, and placed under strict discipline for immediate duty.

Lieut. Col. Buckingham, 1st Asst. Adjt. Gen., is detailed from this department for that service.

II. The enrolled militia, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, exceeds 300,000 men. This force is divided into the 1st, 2d, and 3d Reserve Corps.

The able-bodied force, of other ages, retired from service, but fully competent to meet any demand that the exigencies of the Union may require, exceeds 200,000 men, and will constitute the 4th and 5th Reserve Corps.

The 1st Reserve Corps will be organized forthwith, and be subject to immediate transfer into the "Active Army of Operation." Applications, however, for the organization of the Militia of Reserve will not be limited to this quota; but the companies composing it will receive the post of honor and the first assignment to active duty, in case the country requires their services. The only exception will be in favor of companies now under drill, which failed to receive an assignment into the twenty-two regiments now in camp.

III. The militia of the Reserve will be organized as follows: 1st. Competent military men, or responsible citizens, will apply to this department for an order to raise a company, not exceeding 100 able-bodied men. 2d. A form of enlistment will be mailed, if the application be approved. 3d. The roll will be returned to the office, the election will be ordered, and the officers will be commissioned. 4th. The roll must embrace citizens of the same township, so that they can readily associate themselves and promptly respond to any order from General Head Quarters. 5th. Whenever a company is transferred into the "Active Army of Operation" new commissions will issue, giving due precedence to the grade of the prior commissions so that the earliest commissions in the "Militia of the Reserve" will confer superior rank in the transferred corps.

IV. This organization is designed to leave all domestic and economic machinery of society in full play, until the transfer becomes a necessity. Members of the Militia of the Reserve will therefore devote due attention to their ordinary concerns, and do what they may to prevent idleness, and assure a full crop of all the products of the farm. Any other course will make the struggle doubly burdensome, notwithstanding the fact that Ohio has already in store provisions for a year in advance.

V. The following is the proportion of companies to each County upon such quota: Adams, 8; Allen, 8; Ashland, 10; Ashtabula, 13; Athens, 10; Auglaise, 7; Belmont, 15; Brown, 13; Butler, 15; Carroll, 7; Champaign, 10; Clark, 11; Clermont, 14; Coschocton, 11; Crawford, 10; Cuyahoga, 30; Darke, 12; Defiance, 5; Delaware, 10; Erie, 11; Fairfield, 13; Fayette, 17; Franklin, 20; Fulton, 7; Gallia, 10; Geauga, 7; Greene, 12; Guernsey, 11; Hamilton, 100; Hancock, 10; Hardin, 6; Harrison, 8; Henry, 4; Highland, 12; Hocking, 7; Holmes, 8; Huron, 13; Jackson, 7; Jefferson, 11; Knox, 11; Madison, 6; Mahoning, 11; Marion, 7; Meigs, 12; Mercer, 7; Miami, 13; Monroe, 11; Montgomery, 20; Morgan, 10; Morrow, 8; Muskingum, 19; Noble, 8; Ottawa, 3; Paulding, 2; Perry, 8; Pickaway, 10; Pike, 6; Portage, 10; Preble, 7; Putman, 6; Richland, 13; Rose, 15; Sandusky, 15; Scioto, 10; Seneca, 13; Shelby, 7;

Stack, 18; Summit, 11; Trumbull, 13; Tuscarawas, 14; Union, 8; Van Wert, 5; Vinton, 6; Warren, 12; Washington, 15; Wayne, 15; Williams, 8; Wood, 8; Wyandotte, 7.

A total of 1,000 companies.

VI. As a general rule, public arms will not be issued to the Militia of the Reserve, but a proximate estimate of the number of private rifles in the possession of men expert in their use, shows that, with proper exertion, nearly or quite the entire first contingent of 100,000 men can be armed, and disciplined in hours of leisure, postponing their draft upon the State until they are transferred to the Active corps.

VII. It is the purpose of this department to procure as soon as practicable a "Volunteer Manual" for distribution among the Militia of the Reserve, and to issue a Code of Regulations for their government and discipline.

If the 1st Reserve Corps shall not be filled and officered by the first of June, next, additional companies will be credited to the counties tendering more than their quota. Due record will be made of all applications and proper precedence will be granted in the order of such application.

H. B. CARRINGTON,  
Adjutant General.

By order of the Commander in Chief.

By direction of the War Department, the Adjutant General, who has been appointed the Colonel of the 18th Regular Infantry, and in charge of the General Recruiting Depot for the new Regular Regiments at Camp Thomas, near Columbus, Ohio, was permitted to still act as Adjutant General of the State, until July 1 1861.

In November, 1861, he accompanied the 1st Battalion of the 16th U. S. Infantry, and the 1st and 2d Battalions of his own regiment, the 18th, to Lebanon, Kentucky. Leaving the Battalion of the 16th, with General Buell at Louisville, he was assigned by General Thomas at Lebanon, to command a Brigade, which, besides his two Battalions, included the 9th and 35th Ohio and the 2d Minnesota.

But the War Department required his services at Camp Thomas, to complete the Regular enlistments, designated for his special duty, and he resumed that command.

A crisis was approaching in Kentucky, and he made an appeal to Ohio, as expressed in the following, which resulted in a fresh outburst of patriotic recruiting in both Ohio and Indiana, to meet emergencies which a larger early call of President Lincoln might have anticipated.

From the DAILY CAPITAL CITY FACT, Columbus, O., Monday Evening, August 11, 1862.

We republish from the *Cincinnati Commercial*, a letter of Col. Carrington, full of practical suggestions, respecting our State Militia. By our telegraph despatches it will be seen that Massachusetts is about to assume an attitude similar to that here presented.

Col. Carrington seems to maintain his interest in the Ohio Militia, for which he labored for four years as Adjutant General, with great patience, and at a time when the General Assembly constantly ignored his annual recommendation for a respectable militia establishment. He has quietly borne criticism, pushed a'long his own regiment, the 18th Regulars, and now has the largest in the United States. Awaiting the verdict of the future, he has steadily discharged his duties, unmindful of any personal abuse, and has given himself unsparingly to the cause of the country.

Of thorough military training, a graduate of Yale, a ripe scholar, and a successful lawyer, with moral principle and unfaltering will, he cannot fail to make his mark in this war. Few are better qualified to command, and we believe that he would have the unqualified confidence of the people, if the government should give him a command over the proposed new Western Department.

COLUMBUS, August 7, 1862.

#### TO THE PEOPLE OF OHIO:

The following outline of a plan for the organization of the Ohio Militia, submitted to the State authorities, may be of service in giving shape to the proposed organization in Hamilton County.

The "Militia of the Reserve" showed a paper strength of nearly a thousand companies, the design of its organization being as follows, viz:

1st. To secure to the troops in the field the moral support of a home force adequate for domestic and border protection, and available even in reinforcement of impaired columns in the field.

2d. To bring home to the people the fact that we were engaged in a war that would tax their entire strength, and to interest all Districts of the State in practical preparation for its issues.

3d. To render a response to any demand upon the militia, certain and immediate, without the necessity of additional and expensive camps, or drafting.

The difficulties in the way of its systematic development were numerous. Scarcity of arms and tactics, the absorption of the force in the new requisitions, almost as soon as new companies were formed, and a growing but unfortunate opinion that the force organized was sufficient to terminate the war, and that our border could not be imperilled, were among the elements that impaired its healthy and general adoption.

These difficulties no longer exist. It is true that in Cincinnati alone, over two thousand of this Corps were enrolled promptly, to take the field; but, heretofore, they could neither be instructed nor armed. Now the State has ten thousand copies of Infantry Tactics, conforming literally to those used in the Regular service, and complete in the school of the soldier, the company, and the skirmish drill. Arms, surrendered for improved models, are to some considerable extent available. But, were it otherwise, as the thorough instruction in the facings and marchings is fundamental to giving solidity and momentum to any considerable force, this instruction could be commenced at once, and private arms be used for temporary purposes, in the manual.

I will add one other consideration before giving the plan proposed.

The choice now presented to the American people lies between a short, sharp, effectual and sweeping contest, and a protracted, disheartening and wasting one. Forces in the field must feel that ample support is always sure; that positions once acquired are never to be abandoned; that a spiteful guerilla war upon the route of supplies is impossible; that traitors in the loyal States will be dealt with as sternly as those in arms against the government; that discouragement of enlistments, resistance to taxation or drafting; that street cabals and secret associations in sympathy with rebellion, must and will be broken up and punished; and that the press itself, when prostituted to disloyal uses, and all politicians who show or sustain its treason, will suffer instantaneous and condign punishment. There must never be an hour when Ohio cannot protect herself and send any needed support to her advanced armies. Then, will the days be numbered for all traitors, and the cost and sacrifice of war will be less in proportion as that hour of preparation is hastened.

To this end, the people must realize that they, and not merely the armies in the field, are parties to this struggle. I would have, on Saturday, for at least half the day, in every school district of Ohio, a meeting of able-bodied citizens for instruction in the facing and marching; distribute the tactics through the school libraries; let each military committee, or an officer detailed from the camp of that regimental district, superintend this instruction; close city places of business early, to give their employees the same privilege; turn every manufactory into an evening drill-room for its employees; let the merchant instruct his clerks, or have those of a block, or square, unite together. If invasion threatened either of our counties or cities, this sacrifice of time would be insignificant. Now is the very hour to put forth a similar energy. Let judges and influential citizens take active part. Let it go forth that 200,000 men are under weekly drill, and that Ohio, *en masse*, is preparing to crush this rebellion wherever it shows its head.

Let it be understood that the voice of discouragement and bitter invective against the Government of the United States will not go unrebuked. If we have traitors at home, silence, fine, or export them to a sympathizing region.

The realities of a tremendous struggle are at hand. It is a war of the people, for the people, and to maintain the liberties of the people.

If necessary, let Ohio and Indiana form one district, with center at Cincinnati, at which center shall be reported each new organization, the whole to be placed under some head, who, co-operating with the Governors of these States, shall be able instantly to supply a force wherever required, and adequate to every emergency.

The scheme is practical, because in invasion it would be necessary and natural. Let us anticipate all the possible issues of war with a sagacious and untiring foe, and leave to Providence the future when our own part has been filled by way of preparation. Then will confidence return and victory follow.

Yours truly,

HENRY B. CARRINGTON,  
Col. 18th Infantry, U. S. A.

At the date of this appeal, Bragg had demonstrated towards the Ohio River, while the right wing, under Kirby Smith, entered the Blue Grass Region of Kentucky. Within a week, upon the application of Governor Morton of Indiana, the War Department ordered Col. Carrington to Indiana. Within twelve days, twenty regiments were mustered, armed, paid and en route for Kentucky. Five of these new regiments formed the larger part of the force that fought Kirby Smith at Richmond, Kentucky. Artillery and ammunition were sent from Indianapolis, and the defences opposite Cincinnati were held by Gen. Lew Wallace, until the rally of the Ohio Militia by thousands assured the safety of Cincinnati. The significance of the appeal had earlier verification than its author could have anticipated.

The border contingencies, along the main Federal base at the west, had such developments that the same officer, after his promotion, November 29, 1862, as Brig. Gen., U. S. Vols., continued service in Indiana until one hundred thousand men had been sent to the field; and his own Brigade, as organized by General Rosecrans, of the 15th, 16th, 18th and 19th Regulars, went into the Battle of Stone River under Shepard, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 18th, because the Governor of Indiana protested against its Colonel joining his own legitimate command.

One year later, at Gettysburg, President Lincoln's tribute to the victory of that period was in the spirit of the Ohio Appeal, which at date of its publication, was honored with his approval.

Indiana maintained as a Militia of the Reserve, known as the "Indiana Legion," a force of such efficiency that at one time arms were issued to 18,000, and, at three periods, this force not only assisted in protecting the three great hospitals at Madison, New Albany and Evansville, but upon the approach of Bragg to Louisville in 1862, the Morgan raid of 1863, the Siege of Frankfort in 1864, and in August of the same year, practically guaranteed the safety of the Ohio River border from serious attack.

No other Western State was equally exposed to invasion from without, as well as from internal foes at home; and the Indiana Legion was indeed a "Militia of Reserve," ever on the alert, and equally prompt, in the hour of threatened danger.

These exceptional conditions are fully treated in Vol. XXXIX, Part II, Rebellion Records, Series I.

L. of G.



# Familiar Hints to Indiana Soldiers Taking the Field.

(Reprint of small Pamphlet given to Indiana Volunteers in 1862, republished by *The New York Independent*, January, 1893. The U. S. Christian Commission published and distributed 100,000 copies.)

## I. YOUR ENEMIES — UNCLEANLINESS, PROFANITY, INTEMPERANCE, LEWDNESS.

*Keep the body clean.*—After marching, if feet are sore, bathe in salt and water. Keep the hair close; air your blankets well. You never take cold, no matter how wet, if in motion. When retiring wet, rub the body until reaction comes on. If possible, never retire in a state of perspiration, until the body is clean and dry. Be regular in the calls of nature; constipation results in half the diseases of camp.

*Swearing* profanes the name of the God of battles. Revere Him, if you wish His blessing. Keep your own self-respect, and you cannot become a coward. The habit is unmanly, useless and degrading.

*Drinking*—unless under medical advice, is your greatest curse. A well man was made with *nerves* to sustain him under labor; he can depend upon them. Liquor excites, but brings reaction and ruin. Coffee is a stimulus, and is nutritious. Quit strong drink.

*Lewdness* makes beasts of men—never risk it. Be as pure as when at home. In a word, be as good citizens in the field as if at home, where mothers, wives and maidens look to you for support and favor.

## II. DIET AND COOKING.

You will cook for yourselves. Your rations are super-abundant; save them; you can. In cooking, remember that half cooked food is ruinous. Better use uncooked pork or bacon, hard bread and coffee, than eat victuals half cooked that need perfect cooking. *Beans* require thorough cooking; soak them over night; do n't smoke them; you ruin them; boil them over a slow fire for three hours at least—the same with hominy. Skim your soups often, it will pay you. Start with clear, cold water, in clean kettles. If your kettles are foul your victuals will be foul also. Pepper and salt your soup half an hour before it comes off the fire. *Onions* in your soup are good. They are anti-scorbutic, and if you can get them, they are good against scurvy. If you fry *bacon*, get your fat hot before you put the bacon in the mess pan. The pores of the flesh close up at once, and prevent its becoming greasy and indigestible. Stale bread crumbled and spread over it will help it. Start *potatoes* in cold water, with salt; if the water boils sharply, throw in cold water, and check it. When nearly done, pour off the water, and leave the kettle on until the steam evaporates. You can have mealy potatoes if they are good for anything. To fry *potatoes*, put them first in cold water half an hour; then into hot fat until brown, cutting them in thin slices: if you don't they only accumulate fat.

Boil *rice* gently, stirring constantly until it is soft. Turn it into a kettle or coarse towel, and pour over it fresh cold water; put it then in a clean kettle until dry; serve hot or cold, as convenient, with molasses. Don't burn your *coffee*, use a little fat or sugar, stirring constantly, over a slow fire. When browned, cover with a damp cloth to cool; then grind it, passing the mill twice. Use clean kettles. When the water boils briskly throw in the coffee, having first wet it, and let it boil for two minutes; then dash in a cup of cold water, and take it off the fire; let it stand five minutes, pour it through a flannel strainer into another kettle, to be served. In measuring the water, by rations, allow five per cent.—leeway. *Poor* coffee is secured by excessive boiling. *Good* coffee can be made in a few minutes, as directed.

*Soup* can be made of most anything: save your beef bones for the purpose; skim faithfully. After the first boil, and the scum begins to rise, check your fire, and only let the water simmer. If you boil too hard, the pores of the flesh close, the essence of the meat is retained with all impurities, no scum rises, the meat is hard and tough, the soup is thin and watery. Otherwise, the juices are extracted, the meat is rich and tender, the soup rich and nutritious. The fat skimmed off *keep*, if you can, for other cooking. Cook two hours. Don't put in too much salt and pepper: there is no remedy but thinning the soup, which spoils it. Better add more, if necessary. In *Pork and Bean Soup*, boil briskly for an hour, with the beans alone; then take the kettles off for fifteen minutes, pour off the water, put in clean water, add your pork without rind, and boil an hour and a half or two hours continuously.

Elbow grease and ashes applied to your kettles will not hurt what is to be cooked in them. Grease upon coffee, because of dirty kettles, is an abomination. Keep your kettles clean.

### III. ARMS AND EQUIPMENTS.

These are as wife and family to the soldier. *Pet* them. Keep your musket dry and bright. It may save your life. Don't use sand or brick dust. A little "flour of emery" will last long, and be of service. Don't use oil to excess; a little, carefully applied, and well rubbed, is better; keep flannel for the purpose; see that the cone is clear, the lock action free and regular; your ball-screws and screw-driver always on hand. After cleaning your piece, leave it perfectly dry. A little more time taken will pay the pains. After guard duty at night wipe off the dew, however weary; never sleep until this is done. Better lie down wet yourself, than leave your musket wet, if both cannot be attended to. See there is no water in bayonet scabbard.

Use common blacking for your belts and leather equipments. They will then last. It will pay. When oil or lard is used, use it sparingly, and rub well. It is seldom needed. Don't use strong fat for the purpose. Keep your ammunition dry, your boxes full.

Soldiers need neither *bowie knives* nor *revolvers*. They are a secret

weapon, *too ready* in case of brawls, and *useless* against a foe. Trust your musket and bayonet. If you have six shots, and are hard pressed, you will throw away your musket. You then cease to be a soldier. Remember, *here*, that "crossing bayonets" is never done by any considerable force. Few well authenticated cases are found in history. Push on steadily, coolly and persistently, and you will win.

#### IV. OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS AND COOLNESS OF TEMPER.

These are indispensable to make the good or successful soldier. A thousand Colonels to a regiment is not provided for by regulations. Obey the one you are allowed. Better obey an officer of less experience, who is cool and courageous, than try to dictate to those who are responsible for the regiment.

Your safety is in your courage. The shock of battle is soon over. The cowards, who break and run, suffer most. If abused, or maltreated, remember there is a just and proper remedy. Do n't try to execute the law yourselves. It do n't pay. Manfully ask your rights, but obey orders. But soldiers who do their duty seldom complain. Grumblers exist, always have, always will. But do n't you grumble. Bear toil and labor patiently. You will be rewarded.

#### V. TRANSPORTATION AND RAILROAD CAR DEFENSE.

*By cars.*—Load and unload by platoons, one to the car. A train can load in ten minutes. If in a hostile country, unite the knapsacks of comrades on a seat, hang them between the windows, covering the vital parts. The man by the window can have a ready fire, having butt of musket against interior leg of seat, leaning to window. Comrade carries his piece erect, between his feet. He can load while other fires, exchanging pieces. The men by the windows are number one—their comrades in the seat are number two. If train stops, number twos pass out opposite side from attack—falling upon the ground, firing beneath the car until the whole command can form. If attack be upon both sides, the men should remain firm until the commanding officer selects his place of formation, and then, steadily, by files, march to their position. Haste will only disorganize. Meanwhile a fire may be maintained by a squad from each car to divert attack from the forming parties. Coolness in such circumstances is indispensable to safety; and a prompt formation will defeat the enemy.

Remember, that no train will be urged into the face of a large force. Such attacks are by guerrillas, or small detachments. Your self-possession will save you, and a brisk attack will ruin the assailants.

*On Steamboats.*—Do n't spread over the boat at first. Twice as many men as you suppose may be quartered on a steamer. If formed in single rank, in any space, seven feet deep—face to the partition—unsling knapsacks—deposit them six inches apart—number your

men by companies, in whole numbers — unsling and spread blankets — four double — and you have room, and every man has his place.

Remember, that loud talking is unbecoming a soldier. Never be so situated that the call of your officer cannot be at once heard and responded to. You are minute men in this war. A minute lost is lost forever. Save the minutes, and your toils and labors will soon be at an end.

## VI. THE SICK AND WOUNDED.

Be brothers to those who suffer. Your turn may come next. Be unselfish, for you are comrades. Stint yourselves for those who languish. Don't fret because one breaks down. The best men may give out. Share your canteen of cold coffee or water with the weary. You will not repent it. Better that you suffer in part, than have your regiment strewn for miles by the wayside. Remember, a bandage, even a handkerchief, tightly bound above an artery, or both above and below, if there be much effusion of blood, may check the flow until relief comes. In the hot sun, a sponge, or green leaves in the hat, slightly wet, may prevent sun-stroke. If threatened with frosted feet or fingers, promptly apply cold water until reaction comes on. If very cold and drowsy, do n't give way to sleep until your extremities are warm again. If gruel cannot be procured for the sick on the march, crush corn, extemporize corn meal, and you can, with salt and crackers, make a very respectable substitute. Stale bread, toasted hard, soaked and seasoned, will give nutriment, refresh the sick, and take but a few minutes' stop.

In all things cherish the unity of feeling which makes men one in sympathy, as they must be one in danger and adventure.

## VII. LAST, NOT LEAST.


Remember, this is not a mercenary war — a war for pay, or plunder. Our true condition is that of peace. Armies are but an expansion of police authority, when civil process is inadequate to maintain order in the States. You fight to maintain *civil* authority — that our country, whole and complete again, may again know peace. You are soldiers now — you are again to become citizens. Let all your acts, therefore, however earnest and aggressive upon the enemies of the State, prepare you to become better citizens, inasmuch as, by your toil and sacrifice, you have learned how precious our institutions are, and can realize the value of a well-ordered, peaceful Republic.

Dare, do and endure, and you will be blessed.

Your fellow soldier,

HENRY B. CARRINGTON,

Col. 18th Inf. U. S. A., Com'd'g at Indianapolis,  
And Mustering Officer for Indiana.







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